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ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
The District Court Erred In Granting Rios' Motion To Suppress Test Results Of 
The Blood Draw Obtained Following Rios' Arrest For Vehicular Manslaughter 
And Leaving The Scene Of An Accident 
A Introduction 
The district court erred when it concluded that Rios' failure to sign an 
evidentiary testing consent form following his arrest for driving under the 
influence constituted a per se revocation of his implied consent to submit to 
evidentiary testing. (See generally Appellant's brief.) In response, Rios argues 
that statutory implied consent cannot satisfy the consent exception to the Fourth 
Amendment warrant requirement and that the state was thus required to 
demonstrate that Rios "actually" consented to the testing prior to the 
administration of the blood draw. (See generally Respondent's brief.) A review 
of the record and relevant case law reveals that Rios' argument fails and that the 
district court erred. 
B. Revocable Implied Consent Satisfies The Consent Exception To The 
Fourth Amendment Warrant Requirement 
Requiring that a person submit to a blood alcohol test is a search and 
seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 
767 (1966). "[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior 
approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment - subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated 
exceptions." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). Consent is a valid 
exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. Schneckloth v. 
Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973). Implied consent is statutorily provided 
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for by Idaho Code § 18-8002. "Drivers in Idaho give their initial consent to 
evidentiary testing by driving on Idaho roads voluntarily." State v. Wulff, 157 
Idaho 416, 423, 337 P.3d 575, 582 (2014). However, "[i]nherent in the 
requirement that consent be voluntary is the right of the person to withdraw that 
consent." State v. Halseth, 157 Idaho 643, 646, 339 P.3d 368, 371 (2014). 
In his Respondent's brief, Rios contends that a warrantless blood draw 
cannot be justified by implied consent alone. (Respondent's brief, pp.12-20 
(citing Wulff, 157 Idaho at 423, 337 P.3d at 582; Halseth, 157 Idaho at 646, 339 
P.3d at 371; State v. Arrotta, 157 Idaho 773,774,339 P.3d 1177, 1178 (2014)). 
However, a review of the cases relied upon by Rios reveals that revocable 
implied consent satisfies the warrant exception of the Fourth Amendment. 
In State v. Smith, 159 Idaho 15, _, 355 P.3d 644, 653-655 (2015), the 
Idaho Court of Appeals reviewed recent Idaho Supreme Court cases which 
considered the application of the implied consent statute. In Smith, the parties 
stipulated that the DUI suspect "didn't consent to the blood draw." Smith, 159 
Idaho at_, 355 P.3d at 655. In other words, there was no indication that the 
state presented evidence that Smith provided "additional" or "actual" consent, in 
addition to his statutorily implied consent, at the time of the evidentiary testing. 
Still, relying on the continuing validity of revocable implied consent, the Idaho 
Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's denial of Smith's motion to 
suppress. 1st 
To reach this conclusion, the Idaho Court of Appeals reviewed Wulff, 
Halseth, and Arrotta and concluded that these Idaho Supreme Court cases did 
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not stand for the proposition that statutorily implied consent was rendered invalid 
by Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. 1552 (2013), and instead, that "these 
decisions lead to the conclusion that Idaho's law regarding statutorily implied 
consent retains validity, but that consent may be terminated by a defendant's 
refusal, protest, or objection to alcohol concentration testing." Smith, 159 Idaho 
at_, 355 P.3d at 655. 
The Court of Appeals explained: 
In Wulff, our Supreme Court held that the district court 
"properly concluded that Idaho's implied consent statute was not a 
valid exception to the warrant requirement." Wulff, 157 Idaho at 
423, 337 P.3d at 582. At first glance, this holding would appear to 
preclude the State from continuing to rely on the implied consent 
statute to provide the requisite consent for a warrantless blood 
draw in a suspected DUI case. However, in addressing the 
constitutionality of the statute, the Wulff Court made a salient 
distinction. It identified "two hurdles" the statutory consent must 
overcome to "qualify as voluntary: (1) drivers give their initial 
consent voluntarily and (2) drivers must continue to give voluntary 
consent." Id. The Court considered that the first hurdle was met by 
the statute: "Drivers in Idaho give their initial consent to evidentiary 
testing by driving on Idaho roads voluntarily." Id. (emphasis 
added) (citing [State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 303, 160 P.3d 739, 
7 42 (2007)]. It was the second hurdle the court found problematic, 
noting that Idaho appellate decisions interpreting section 18-8002 
had held that a person could not revoke his statutorily implied 
consent. "Because Idaho does not recognize a driver's right to 
revoke his implied consent," the Court held, "Idaho has a per se 
exception to the warrant requirement." Wulff, 157 Idaho at 423, 
337 P.3d at 582. Thus, the Court held, it was overruling previous 
case law "to the extent that they applied Idaho's implied consent 
statute as an irrevocable per se rule that constitutionally allowed 
forced warrantless blood draws." Id. 
That Idaho's implied consent statute continues to be valid, 
albeit in a form that is revocable, is supported by two subsequent 
cases issued by our Supreme Court. Approximately one month 
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after Wulff, the Court decided Halseth, 157 Idaho 643, 339 P.3d 
368, holding: 
[A]n implied consent statute such as ... Idaho's does 
not justify a warrantless blood draw from a driver who 
refuses to consent ... or objects to the blood draw .... 
Inherent in the requirement that consent be voluntary 
is the right of the person to withdraw that consent. 
Id. at 646, 339 P.3d at 371. Then, several weeks later in State v. 
Arrotta, 157 Idaho 773, 774, 339 P.3d 1177, 1178 (2014), the Court 
cited to Wulff and Halseth for the proposition that "a suspect can 
withdraw his or her statutorily implied consent to a test for the 
presence of alcohol." 
Smith, 159 Idaho at_, 355 P.3d at 654-655. (footnotes omitted). 
Indeed, it is the revocability of statutorily implied consent that permits the 
continued validity of such statutes after McNeely. Therefore, until a DUI suspect 
affirmatively revokes his implied consent, that implied consent satisfies the 
consent exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. In such an 
instance, the state is not required to make any showing of additional or "actual" 
consent. 
The only authority Rios cites to that directly stands for the proposition he 
sets forth in his Respondent's brief is a dissent from an Idaho Court of Appeals 
opinion. In Bobeck v. Idaho Transportation Department, 2015 WL 5602964 
(Idaho App., September 24, 2015), a majority of the Court of Appeals affirmed a 
decision of the Transportation Department suspending Bobeck's driver's license 
following a warrantless blood draw. The majority concluded that statutorily 
implied consent satisfied the consent exception to the Fourth Amendment 
warrant requirement even where Bobeck was "allegedly unconscious" at the time 
of the blood draw, and thus did not, and could not, affirmatively resist or object to 
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the evidentiary testing. lsi at *4-6. In dissent, Judge Gutierrez disagreed with 
the majority and concluded that "statutory implied consent is insufficient to satisfy 
the consent exception to the warrant requirement," and that the "consent 
exception requires actual consent." lsi at *6-7. 
Under the proposition set forth by Rios, and the dissent in Bobeck, 
statutory implied consent would be of no effect. This would be contrary to the 
language of McNeely and the aforementioned Idaho Supreme Court cases which 
have acknowledged the continuing validity of revocable implied consent. In 
McNeely, the United States Supreme Court specifically recognized the validity of 
implied consent laws as one of the "legal tools" available to states "to enforce 
their drunk-driving laws and to secure BAC evidence without undertaking 
warrantless nonconsensual blood draws." McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 1566; see also 
State v. Okken, 2015 WL 8159473, at *5 n. 2 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2015) ("Numerous 
jurisdictions have addressed McNeely challenges to their implied consent 
statutes. Contrary to Defendant's contention, our conclusion conforms with the 
national view. Statutes that create revocable consent have uniformly been held 
constitutional, even where refusal carries criminal penalties." (citing United States 
v. Sugiyama, 2015 WL 4092494, at *4-10 (D. Md. 2015)); People v. Agnew, 
2015 WL 7294822, at *13 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015) ("Under the implied consent law, 
moreover, a motorist consents in advance to testing if arrested for driving under 
the influence, and the issue is then whether the arrested motorist withdraws that 
consent by refusing to test."). 
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Revocable statutorily implied consent satisfies the consent exception to 
the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. Therefore, Rios consented to the 
warrantless blood draw unless he affirmatively revoked this consent. The state 
was not required to provide evidence that Rios provided additional, "actual" 
consent at the time of the evidentiary testing. 
C. The District Court Erred In Determining That Rios Revoked His Implied 
Consent 
The state additionally argues that the district court erred in determining 
that Rios effectively revoked his implied consent before the warrantless blood 
draw. (See Appellant's brief, pp.8-12.) Because Rios has primarily argued that 
statutorily implied consent cannot satisfy the consent exception to the Fourth 
Amendment warrant requirement, the state relies on the arguments from its 
Appellant's brief for these propositions. 
However, the state disagrees with one of Rios' characterizations of the 
state's argument. Rios argued that the state "proposes this Court create a rule 
that in order to effectively revoke or withdraw one[']s implied consent, such 
revocation must be done by physical force or otherwise unpeaceful behavior." 
(Respondent's brief, pp.20-21.) The state has proposed no such rule. In its 
Appellant's brief, the state specifically argued that the district court's expressed 
belief that Idaho law did not require a driver to "physically resist a blood draw" did 
not compel its conclusion in this case, because there was no evidence in the 
record that Rios even verbally objected to the blood draw. (Appellant's brief, 
p.10 n.3.) Further, numerous Idaho appellate opinions have recognized a DUI 
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suspect's verbal revocation of his statutorily implied consent. See Wulff, 157 
Idaho at 417, 337 P. 3d at 576 (defendant refused breath test and became 
uncooperative during the blood draw telling the nurse "you're not touching me"); 
Arrotta, 157 Idaho at 773-774, 339 P.3d at 1177-1178 (defendant refused the 
breath test and asked if he could refuse the blood test); Halseth, 157 Idaho at 
644, 339 P. 3d at 369 (the defendant protested a warrantless blood draw, stating 
"You can't take my blood! I refused! How can you just take it without 
permission?"). A DUI suspect may physically or verbally revoke his statutorily 
implied consent to evidentiary testing. In this case, as the state has previously 
argued, the district court erred by failing to analyze the totality of the 
circumstances surrounding whether Rios affirmatively and effectively revoked his 
implied consent in such a manner. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court's 
order suppressing the test results of the blood draw and remand for further 
proceedings. 
DATED this 30th day of December, 2015 
MARK W. OLSON 
Deputy Attorney General 
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